Abstract
Introduction
Defining a unified watermarking evaluation metric is a non-trivial task. Most domain specific metrics are derived from the concept of watermarking capacity and do not directly relate to the main purpose of watermarking per se, i.e. claiming ownership in court. Theoretical approaches [3] [10] [11] [12] [16] explore the broader area of steganography and information hiding in a generic manner.
Proof of ownership is usually achievable by demonstrating that the particular piece of data exhibits a certain rare property (read "hidden message" or "watermark"), usually known only to Alice (with the aid of a "secret" -read "watermarking key"), the property being so rare that if one considers any other random piece of data similar (in terms of usability, see below) to the one in question, this property is "very improbable" to apply.
There is a threshold determining Jared's convince-ability related to the "very improbable" assessment. Nevertheless this defines a main difference from steganography: Jared doesn't care what the property is, as long as Alice can prove it is she who embedded/induced it to the original (non-watermarked) data object.
It is to be stressed here that another particularity of watermarking is the emphasis on 'detection' rather than 'extraction'. Extraction of a watermark (or bits of it) is usually a part of the detection process but just complements the process up to the extent of increasing the ability to convince in court. If recovering the watermark data in itself becomes more important than detecting the actual existence of it (aka. 'yes/no answer') then this is a drift towards covert communication and pure steganography.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 formalizes some of the main concepts such as watermark, usability, usability domains, watermarking algorithm and defines our metric, watermark power. Section 3 presents a simple scenario where metrics derived from hiding capacity perform poorly in evaluating a certain watermarking method whereas the concept of power delivers good results. Section 4 defines future envisioned research issues.
Model and Definitions.
Let be the domain of all possible data objects to be considered for watermarking.
Considering any reasonable security assumptions and attacks, it becomes clear that a correct watermarking algorithm has to assure that the domain of all possible watermarked data objects (i.e. results from watermarking objects in ) should be a subset of . For simplicity we assume that any considered algorithm produces watermarked objects only in or that is simply the union of all the closures over of all resulting watermarked objects from considered algorithms.
For example in case of digital media objects we can simply assume that is the set of all variable sized bit strings over ¼ ½ .
Objects ¾ have associated values induced by the object creator. Watermarking tries to protect this association between the value carrying object and its creator. Complex objects can exhibit different value levels when put to different uses. We need a way to express the different associated values of objects, in different usability domains. Ù . The concept of usability enables the definition of a certain threshold below which the object is not "usable" anymore in the given domain. In other words, it "lost its value" to an unacceptable degree. The notion of usability is related to distortion. A highly distorted object (e.g. as result of watermark embedding or attacks) will likely suffer a drop in its distortion domain usability.
For simplicity, in the following we consider a single usability domain ¾ Í, unless otherwise specified.
Change in Usability:
The difference in usability is defined as ¡Ù ¢ ¢ Í ½ ½ , where ¡Ù´ ½ ¾ µ Ù´ ½ µ Ù´ ¾ µ. This quantity is easier to derive from a real world mapping and has a higher impact on the actual embedding decisions made.
Usability Vicinity: Let Î Í be a set of usability domains and a maximum allowed difference in usability ¡Ù Ñ Ü . Then we say that element Ü ¾ is in the radius ¡Ù Ñ Ü usability vicinity of ¾ with respect to Î In plain words, a watermark can be defined as a special induced (through watermarking) property (Û) of a certain watermarked object ¼ ¾ , so rare, that if we consider any other object Ü ¾ , with a "close-enough" usability level with the original object , the probability that Ü exhibits the same property can be upper-bounded.
Note: Intuitively, one main challenge of watermarking is to find/derive ¼ such that, given only ¼ it will be very hard for an attacker to determine an Ü ¼ inside the usability vicinity of .
Algorithm:
A watermarking algorithm can be described as a functional ¢ Ã ¢ Ï , which, given as input an object ¾ provides a watermarked version of the object, ¼ , and an associated property functional Û that enables watermark detection. Notation: Let be the set of all over a given . In other words, an attack tries to maintain the attacked watermarked object within the usability vicinity of the original non-watermarked one, while making it impossible to recover the watermark. Notation: Let Û be the set of all attacks Þ for a given Û.
Watermark Power: 5 In designing a new metric for the power of a certain watermark we have to take into consideration two main aspects, namely (i) how "rare" is the watermark and (ii) how easy it is to find and apply a successful attack for it. The "rarity" of the watermark is modeled by¯as defined above. Estimating real-life raw attack-ability of algorithms is basically intractable, thus we have to assume that a successful attack is always available.
A powerful marking method should result in a watermarked object ¼ , at the "outskirts" of the allowable usability vicinity of the original , making it hard/impossible for an attacker to directly derive or the considered vicinity set.
For a given watermarked object ¼ and associated property Û, we define the power of the watermark as:
Note: Î ¼ is the intersection of the usability vicinities of and ¼ . It defines the target space for any successful attack, effectively modeling the ease of finding a non-watermarked, usable version of ¼ . 5 The present definition requires more careful attention and many future refinements are envisioned. It is given only as an illustrative example of the new proposed approach and is not to be taken directly to implementation. 6 The notation ÔÓÛ Ö´Ûµ will be used if ¼ is implied by the context. Note: È´ Þ ¾ µ defines the probability that a successful attack can be found for a given algorithm. In the following we will consider it ½ (highly likely).
If we consider È´ Þ ¾ µµ ½ we have a formula easier to sample and compute:
The power of a certain watermark is directly related to its convince-ability towards Jared the Judge. The weaker the watermark (higher the false hit probability upper-bound) the less convincing it will be.
Note: It is to be noted that in real life, a certain watermark embedded into an object can be 'viewed' through different property functionals, that is there can be multiple Û's that reveal the given base watermark with different 's. This basically corresponds to different methods of watermark detection. The concept of power is also distinguishing among them.
Relative Algorithm Power: If given two algorithms
½ ¾ ¾ we say that ½ is weaker than ¾ with respect to if, whenever applied to the same object ¾ and key ¾ Ã , ½ returns an associated (property functional,object) pair´Û ½ ½ µ that is weaker than the one returned by ¾ .
Weighted Algorithm Power:
Whereas relative algorithm power indeed compares two applications (i.e. with respect to a certain object ¼ ¾ ) of the algorithms we need a stronger, broader 7 , way of measuring watermarking effectiveness of algorithms.
Let there be a certain distribution ´ µ ¾´½ µ over the objects of
could be the probability that a certain object ¾ will be considered for watermarking/attack/malicious use, this can be estimated statistically by normalized counts). Let ¾ be a watermarking algorithm considered. If we use the notation ´ µ ´ ¼ Û ¼ µ we define the weighted algorithm watermarking power by the following formula:
Note: If we assume that then the above definition basically converges to the average of the power of all individual applications to all the objects in .
Main Challenge: Power and Usability.
Given a maximum level for difference in usability ¡Ù Ñ Ü and a maximum upper bound on the false positive probabilitȳ Ñ Ü , the first challenge of watermarking is to find the most powerful marking algorithm ¾ for a given key ¾ Ã 7 The required "breadth" derives from the fact that we would like to be able to assert that "in general" one algorithm is better than another. In other words, the main concern in watermarking lies with keeping the required usability level of the object unchanged or close to its original value, while still featuring enough power. Thus, an appropriate algorithm will try to determine the main usability domains for a particular to-be-watermarked object and then preserve usability in those domains.
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Scenario
One could argue that, using capacity as a measure of the power of "persuasion" of a certain algorithm works, if, instead of hiding a known text (e.g. "This is the property of Alice"), the algorithm hides a hash of it or some other form of encrypted secret. This -the argument goes -will increase the actual "persuasiveness" of the algorithm and will tightly relate capacity to the convince-ability towards Jared, because, after all, only Alice could have known the encoded secret and the probability that anyone else might know it, is computationally zero and thus secure.
Whereas the above argument makes a good point of showing that hiding a secret (i.e. that looks like random "garbage" to the attacker) is much better than hiding a plain-text message, it misses the point in case of existing trivial attacks on the algorithm as a whole.
In the following we present a simple scenario in which a metric based mainly on hiding capacity cannot predict the weakness of a marking algorithm, whereas the weighted algorithm watermarking power metric performs well.
For illustration purposes, consider an algorithm in the space of LSB watermarking algorithms. Those algorithms are known to be weak, because of trivial attacks that can be successfully deployed against them [2] [13] [14] .
Let be the space of images (e.g. JPEG pictures). Given some normalized image distortion metric in a trivial usability domain (e.g. HVS -Human Visual System), Ñ ¢ ¼ ½ , lets consider ¾ and the usability vicinity of of radius ¡Ù Ñ Ü Ñ´ ¼ µ. ¼ ¾ is obtained from by altering the LSB subset of such that Ñ´ ¼ µ is maximal 8 .
If we assume (like it is generally understood) that altering LSB information (to the extent given above) is usually tolerable 9 , because the given usability 8 We refrained from actually specifying the method for simplicity purposes. In some cases, zero-ing the LSB information in will achieve a maximal distortion but specifying this method is not important to our point. 9 That is, ¡ÙÑ Ü, the usability vicinity radius, is accepted by Jared the Judge in a Court proof. vicinity contains Ç´¾ ÄË µ elements (many), and because È´Û´Ü µ ½ Û´ ¼ µ ½µ as defined in (1) cannot be upper bound (i.e. it is ½), the power of any LSB algorithm tends to ¼ (weakest) rendering the algorithm (rightfully) unusable in Court.
On the other hand, if available encoding capacity (capacity in LSB can be arbitrary large, depending on the encoding method and on the size of the LSB space) would have been a major factor in providing Court confidence, and knowledge about obvious attacks (e.g. zero all LSB info) would not have been available, then the alleged non-zero confidence may have determined its undeserved use in Court proofs.
Although the example is not the most accurate one (defining a "perfect" case is out of the space requirements of this poster) it certainly is relevant intuitively, linking the idea of measuring watermarking algorithm quality to its final goal, ownership proof and creation rights affirmation in Court.
Conclusions
We defined main generic watermarking domain issues and presented a new metric aiming at qualitatively measuring watermarking algorithms.
We stressed our metric, watermarking power, versus any arbitrary domain-specific metric as being a better formula, essentially linked to the underlying final purpose of any watermarking algorithm. A simple example was given, outlining the main differences.
Further work is required in refining the given metric and determining different data specific applications. Integration with existing domain specific work is another point of future interest. . He has also served on many conference program committees, and state and federal panels. His research interests include the design and analysis of algorithms, in particular for the application areas of computer security and computational geometry.
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